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ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether philosophers of argument, in spite of their disavowing ‘timeless 
principles’, nevertheless embrace a set of principles, or axioms, to underlie argumentation theory. First, it reviews 
the thinking of some prominent philosophers of argument; second, it extracts some principles common to their 
philosophies; and third, it draws out possible consequences for argumentation theory and asks whether such theory 
has an underlying political posture. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Each of the principal founders of the modern argumentation movement ― Chaim Perelman, 
Stephen Toulmin, and Charles Hamblin ― has repudiated the Cartesian rationalism of traditional 
logic. Perelman writes that “the very nature of deliberation and argumentation is opposed to 
necessity and self-evidence … we combat uncompromising and irreducible philosophical 
oppositions presented by all kinds of absolutism”. Toulmin writes that “certainly language as we 
know it consists, not of timeless propositions, but of utterances dependent in all sorts of ways on 
the context or occasion on which they were uttered”. And Hamblin notes that “the complicated 
shuffle [in the practice of formal logic] involving the construction of ‘alternative’ systems 
disguises the fact that nothing is proved absolutely at all, and that an unpalatable theorem can 
sometimes be a ground for going back and altering the axioms or rules”. 
Each philosopher has challenged the self-enthronement of formal logic’s assuming the 
posture of ‘God’s eye-view’ and establishing self-evident principles. Indeed, these philosophers 
of argument set the course for those taking up their manifesto to rethink argumentation and then 
to have it address practical matters in the messy world of everyday life where nothing is fixed 
and permanent. Accordingly, logic, or the assessment of arguments, has been broadened well 
beyond the impersonal character and timelessness of deductive necessity to include matters 
traditionally excluded, namely, matters of rhetoric, pragmatics, dialogical dynamics, critical 
thinking, and communication studies. And while there are a variety of trends and lively 
differences within the argumentation movement, argumentation theorists are generally agreed 
about the transitory nature of logic as it addresses the transitory nature of the human condition ― 
that very condition establishing the arena of argumentative discourse. In this connection, then, 
Christopher Tindale, a contemporary argumentation theorist who invokes Perelman’s spirit, 
writes:
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Truth … relates to the determinations of audiences; it is a product of argumentative situations, open to scrutiny 
and to challenge. To proceed this way is to break with any notion of objective Truth that is the goal and 
condition of argumentation. Such a notion of Truth demands the cessation of argumentation. 
 
And Trudy Govier, another contemporary argumentationist, remarks that “if we move from truth 
to acceptability and from validity to a variety of less determinate and clearcut standards, we are 
allowing, in effect, that justification itself is relative to time, place, and background beliefs”. Just 
here we find a specter of relativism haunting, or putatively haunting, argumentation studies. This 
topic has been taken up by philosophers of argument, such as Tindale, Govier, and Robert Pinto, 
and it continues to be a matter of concerned discussion. However, a topic not especially 
addressed by philosophers of argument concerns the principles, or axioms, underlying 
argumentation theory as such theory is used in assessing arguments.1 
This paper investigates whether argumentationists in fact hold a set of underlying principles 
not subject to deliberation. First, it reviews the thinking of some prominent philosophers of 
argument; second, it extracts some axioms common to these philosophers that underpin their 
philosophies of argument; and third, it draws out possible consequences for argumentation 
theory and asks whether argumentation theory embraces an underlying political posture. 
 
2. AN INITIAL IMPULSE FOR CHALLENGING FORMAL LOGIC 
 
Informal logicians ― and argumentationists generally ― early experienced an uneasiness about 
the efficacy of formal logic for treating matters of everyday life. It is no mystery that their having 
been impelled in this direction emerged from their encountering classroom frustrations during 
the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the United States, that combined (1) recognizing that formal 
logic textbooks were out of touch with everyday matters with (2) an increasing critical 
dissatisfaction with consumer society ― and especially in this connection with the techniques 
and effects of advertising ― along with (3) an ever sharpening criticism of American foreign and 
domestic policy in respect of the Viet Nam War and civil rights ― and in this connection with 
the rhetoric of disingenuous political figures. A cursory glance at argumentation literature 
reveals the richness of these studies and their relevance for guiding humanists concerned to 
address the many politically charged ‘conversations’ in our modern pluralistic and increasingly 
global community. There is no mistaking an overarching concern among argumentationists, 
whatever their theoretical differences, to empower people with capacities to reason critically and 
to assess incisively the conflicting argumentations that play an important role in the lives of 
ordinary human beings. Christopher Tindale, to take only one example, promotes Chaim 
Perelman’s notion that “[a]rguers address the whole person, not the isolated intellect or emotion, 
and they consider as a natural course the circumstances and differences involved” (1999: 201; 
emphasis added). Moreover, he notes that  
 
a theory of argumentation and its associated notion of reasonableness should contribute to the development of 
the idea of the human, facilitate an environment in which it can flourish, and promote ends that connect the 
threads of that project. (1999: 202; emphasis added) 
 
 
1
 Recognizing differences among informal logicians, pragma-dialecticians, communication theorists, dialogue 
logicians, and rhetoricians, we nevertheless also recognize a core of tenets they share as forming various currents in 
the argumentation movement. We have coined ‘argumentationist’ or ‘argumentation theorist’ to denote a logician 
who generally subscribes to this core of tenets. 
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Tindale expresses a foundational humanist impulse animating argumentationists, the same 
impulse that animated Perelman, Toulmin, and Hamblin, the acknowledged progenitors of the 
modern argumentation movement. The volume of textbooks on informal logic and critical 
thinking and their selections of practical, real arguments to exercise a student’s newly acquired 
evaluation skills attest to this concern. A salient theme among argumentation theorists is 
promoting the pragmatics of argumentation to broaden and secure a more democratic society. 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca explicitly state that their new rhetoric aims to fight absolutism in 
all its forms and resists totalitarianism (1969: 510). 
 
3. SOME SHARED TENETS AMONG PHILOSOPHERS OF ARGUMENT 
 
Informal logicians and argumentation theorists have not minced words about their dissatisfaction 
with traditional formal logic. Hamblin had exhorted that “[w]hat is, above all, necessary is to 
dethrone deduction from its supposed pre-eminent position as a provider of certainty” (1970: 
250; emphasis added). This statement was a ‘shot heard round the world by new logicians’ that 
opened new and fruitful lines of inquiry that continue to be explored. A review of the original 
works of the founders of the argumentation movement along with the works of those who have 
been contributing to argumentation studies since the 1970s reveals a rather uniform set of beliefs 
underlying the diverse currents of argumentation philosophy. Indeed, recognizing this set of 
tenets might help to objectify an underlying unity of these various currents. In any case, among 
these tenets are the following.2 
 
* Soundness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a good argument. An 
argument’s goodness turns not on the truth of its premises nor on its formal validity but on 
the acceptability of its premises and the suitability of its inferential links. 
 
* The deductive model of a good argument does not properly serve argument evaluation. The 
distinction between deduction and induction is not only inexact but specious. An argument 
consists in assertions and statements made by human beings in an imperfect world; it does 
not consist in atemporal propositions. 
 
* Arguing is a social activity always embedded situationally and always expressed by means of 
a natural language. An argument is something personal, not something impersonal. Thus, as a 
natural language object contextually situated, an argument is replete with ambiguity and 
nuance. 
 
 
2
 Our representation of informal logic and argumentation theory derives from a variety of sources, notably from 
informal logic textbooks, collections of essays, and from recent monographs. See references cited below. We have 
emphasized working with practicing logicians who also treat theoretical matters, and we have worked principally 
with the texts of Ralph Johnson, J. Anthony Blair, Trudy Govier, Christopher Tindale, Robert Pinto, Douglas 
Walton, David Hitchcock, and John Woods as a core of proponents not only because of their having been long-time 
active contributors to developments in argumentation studies, but also because they are among its founders. Among 
textbooks we surveyed are those by: M. Scriven (1976), R. Johnson & J. A. Blair (1977), R. Fogelin (1978), S. 
Toulmin, R. Rieke, & A. Janik (1979), D. Hitchcock (1983), T. Govier (1988), J. Freeman (1993), D. Walton 
(1989), H. Kahane & N. Cavender (1998), and L. Groarke & C. Tindale (2003). These textbooks, many in multiple 
editions, range over the duration of the informal logic movement and represent an important core of argumentation 
‘philosophy’. Among recent monographs we have considered, which also serve as excellent digests, are those by: 
Johnson (2000), Govier (1999), Walton and Alan Brinton (1997), Tindale (1999), van Eemeren, Blair, & Willard 
(2003), Don Levi (1999), Willard (1989). We also have considered Walton (1987) and Robert Pinto (2001). 
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* Appraising the cogency or reasonableness of an argument requires close attention to its 
context. Reasonableness is not rationality as rationality is traditionally understood to be 
context-independent. Rather, an argument’s cogency is participant- or audience-dependent, 
and not an objective property inhering in a P-c argument. Since an argument always exists 
within a particular context, special attention must be given to assessing premise relevance 
and the sufficiency of their support for a conclusion. 
 
* There are no clear demarcations between an arguer, an audience, an argument (a product), an 
argumentation (a process) that involves an exchange between disputants, procedures for 
managing those exchanges (dialectic), and an argument’s presentation (rhetoric). 
 
4. AN ESPECIAL CRITICISM OF FORMAL LOGIC 
 
Argumentationists generally consider formal logic (FL) to prefer axiomatic fixedness and to 
eschew deliberation. In this connection, then, FL does not describe reality — least of all does it 
capture how human beings deliberate. The deductive model, even as a regulative principle, is 
inadequate and not universally applicable, since not only is its ideal unattainable but also it is not 
subscribed to by every audience. The Cartesian ideal of deducing truths from foundational self-
evident truths is suspect; for, indeed, there are no self-evident, non-controversial truths. 
Moreover, FL eschews ambiguity, requires univocity, and works abstractly with a logically 
perfect language. However, arguing occurs in a natural language, which is replete with 
ambiguity, nuance, equivocal expressions, and is not abstract — none of which is amenable to 
such analysis. Applying formal rules to extract the propositions expressed by assertions distorts 
the original statements. 
At this juncture we might cite some passages from prominent proponents on this especially 
poignant criticism of FL’s inadequacy. Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca write: 
 
[The New Rhetoric] constitutes a break with a concept of reason and reasoning due to Descartes [who made “the 
self-evident the mark of reason”] which has set its mark on Western philosophy for the last three centuries. … The 
very nature of deliberation and argumentation is opposed to necessity and self-evidence, since no one deliberates 
where the solution is necessary or argues what is self-evident. (1969: 1) 
 
Take away the guarantee which God gives to self-evidence and, suddenly, all thought becomes human and 
fallible, and no longer sheltered from controversy. … But lacking self-evidence that can be imposed on 
everyone, a hypothesis, to be accepted, must be supported by good reasons, recognized as such by other people, 
members of the same scientific community. The status of knowledge thus ceases to be impersonal because 
every scientific thought becomes a human one, i.e., fallible, situated in and subjected to controversy. (Perelman 
1982: 159; cf. 24)3 
 
Toulmin complements Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca when he writes that: 
 
The ambition to cast logic into a mathematical form … [motivated logicians to] systematis[e] the principles of 
sound reasoning and [to] theoris[e] about the canons of argument … [and to maintain] the ideal of the subject as 
a formal, deductive, and preferably an axiomatic science … as more important than its practical applicability. 
 
3
 Consider also: “Objectivity, as it relates to argumentation, must be reconsidered and reinterpreted if it is to have 
meaning in a conception that does not allow the separation of an assertion from the person who makes it” (1969: 
59). “In modern logic, the product of reflection on mathematical reasoning, the formal systems are no longer related 
to any rational evidence whatever. … The search for unquestionable univocity has even led the formalistic logicians 
to construct systems in which no attention is paid to the meaning of the expressions” (1969: 13). 
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(1958: 177) [Logic, on this model] is concerned with timeless truths about its own theoretical entities (1958: 
178). 
 
[In respect of soundness in predictive arguments] if validity is to be a timeless ‘logical relation’ between the 
statements alone, facts about their occasion of utterance must be swept aside as irrelevant. … looking down 
from his Olympian throne, he then sets himself to pronounce about the unchangeable relations between them. 
But taking this kind of God’s-eye-view distracts one completely from the practical problems out of which the 
question of validity itself springs. … Questions about the acceptability [or soundness] of arguments have in 
practice to be understood and tackled in a context quite as much as questions about the acceptability of 
individual utterances, and this practical necessity the purely formal logician strikes out of the account before 
even beginning his work. (1958: 184-185) 
 
And Hamblin writes: 
 
A proof, I take it, is just a knock-down argument; but this model of proof, far from setting a high standard of 
argument-worth for us, completely lets slip certain important desiderata. For example, it quite fails to ban 
circular reasoning for us, and one is encouraged to imagining that there is ‘really nothing wrong’ with using a 
formula to prove itself, or an axiom to prove an axiom, or a rule to prove a formula (such as modus ponens) 
interpretable as the expression of the rule. Equivocation is apparently also regarded as impossible, or the invalid 
arguments that it may lead to as ‘formally valid’. The shortness of the steps and the transparency of the axioms 
and rules, whose rationale is the provision of a guarantee against error, is not only not a protection against these 
other sources of invalidity but a smoke-screen that can help them to slip through unnoticed; and it is not 
uncommon for the fussiness of a formal proof to defeat its own end by making it extremely laborious to follow, 
if not actually obscure. Yet in spite of it all it is a commonplace of modern Logic that highly paradoxical 
theorems have been ‘proved’ from harmless-looking axioms and rules. The complicated shuffle involving the 
construction of ‘alternative’ systems disguises the fact that nothing is proved absolutely at all, and that an 
unpalatable theorem can sometimes be a ground for going back and altering the axioms or rules. (1993: 249; cf. 
251) 
 
In another but related respect FL focuses on rationality rather than reasonableness. FL has 
concentrated on a model of Cartesian rationality and diminished the importance of reasonableness. 
That model of rationality has been proffered as universal, objective, absolute, and atemporal. 
However, since this platonic realm remains forever beyond human reach, humans are left with 
having to make reasonable decisions based on the available evidence. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca write that: 
 
It is the idea of self-evidence as characteristic of reason, which we must assail, if we are to make place for a 
theory of argumentation that will acknowledge the use of reason in directing our own actions and influencing 
those of others. (1969: 3) 
 
The assertion that whatever is not objectively and indisputably valid belongs to the realm of the arbitrary and 
subjective creates an unbridgeable gulf between theoretical knowledge, which alone is rational, and action, for 
which motivations would be wholly irrational. (1969: 512) 
 
Toulmin in this connection calls for a ‘return to reason’ aims to dethrone the Westphalian, or 
Cartesian, imperial rationality with egalitarian reasonableness (2001: 21-22, 156-157; cf. 204), 
the one ― theoretical arguments ― formal, abstract and general, empty, context-free, and 
platonic pure and timeless, value-neutral, the other ― factual narratives ― substantive, timely, 
practical and local, empirical, situation-dependent, and everyday and ethically loaded (2001: 24), 
desituated or disembedded on the one hand, situated or embedded on the other hand (2001: 26). 
In addition, Toulmin’s social history of logic locates the split between the reasonable and the 
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rational in the Peace of Westphalia, out of which came absolute sovereignty, established religion, 
and logical demonstration, all of which share two common features: “[1] all of them operated 
top-down, and gave power to oligarchies ― political, ecclesiastical, or academic ― that 
supported one another … [2] they formed a single [ideological] package” (2001: 156).4 
And Hamblin notes that: 
 
So long as it is the logic of practice that is being discussed, it is important to relate the concepts of truth, 
validity, and knowledge to dialectical concepts in the right way. … In the limiting case in which one person 
constructs an argument for his own edification … his own acceptance of premisses and inference are all that can 
matter to him; and to apply alethic criteria to the argument is surreptitiously to bring in the question of our own 
acceptance of it. When there are two or more parties to be considered, an argument may be acceptable in 
different degrees to different ones or groups, and a dialectical appraisal can be conducted on a different basis 
according to which party or group one has in mind; but again, if we try to step outside and adjudicate, we have 
no basis other than our own on which to do so. Truth and validity are onlookers’ concepts and presuppose a 
God’s eye-view of the arena. … [onlookers might intervene and thus] become simply another participant in an 
enlarged dialectical situation and that the words ‘true’ and ‘valid’ have become, for [the participant] too, empty 
stylistic excrescences. To another onlooker, my statement that so-and-so is true is simply a statement of what I 
accept. (1993: 242-243) “This point … is of fundamental philosophical importance” (1993: 243; emphasis 
added) 
 
However, there is also more to be said against the alethic criteria and in favour of a set based on acceptability or 
acceptance rather than truth. … we should consider, also, the case in which someone, with good reason, accepts 
a given set of premises and a given inference-process, and becomes convinced of a consequent conclusion 
[outside of making a quasi-moral judgment]. … but, if we are to draw the line anywhere [respecting relevance 
of ‘to whom’], acceptance by the person the argument is aimed at ― the person for whom the argument is an 
argument ― is the appropriate basis of a set of criteria [for argument appraisal]. (1970: 241-242) 
 
Now, having reviewed some tenets of argumentation philosophy, we are in a position to identify 
some additional principles that underlie and direct their thinking. Particularly important in 
connection with their overarching concerns for (1) the pragmatics of discourse, (2) requirements 
of relevance, (3) audience adherence, and (4) a theater of good will is their concern for the 
human person. In this respect, then, we need to consider in what way the philosophy of argument 
is more appropriately placed under applied ethics than strictly speaking within the realm of logic 
per se. 
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